In recent times and over the last couple of decades, Cyprus has faced major challenges; demographic, socioeconomic, a critical financial drawback in 2013, a world health crisis in 2020, the FDI boom in recent years, and sanctions on foreign citizens, just to name a few. All that in the face of a country where populations are still living divided for over half a century now (the major political issue). This article, however, aims to focus on a single issue which we believe plays a critical role in the level of the country’s social welfare status daily. Yet, we have the feeling that through the years, it has been overlooked and paid much less attention to, than what it deserves by the mass majority of stakeholders. This issue is no other than the country’s Social Insurance Scheme.
The Social Insurance Scheme affects the people of Cyprus and the economy both directly and indirectly, day in day out, via a series of interlinked events. It should be the backbone of the economy for the elderly and the pensioners, while it should provide the fundamental feeling of future security to the currently employed populations. However, before we jump into a discussion with regards to the way the Scheme is being operated and managed and a review and assessment of its past, present and future outlooks, below we choose to present a summary of some interesting economic data for Cyprus. The timespan we chose is from 2012 (pre-crisis year) up to and including the recent year 2024 (13 years), presented in Tables 1-5. The data is very relevant to this discussion:
Average Price at end of 2011 (assumption for simplicity) : | €50.00 | |
---|---|---|
Year | Inflation Rate | New Average Price (€) |
2012 | 3.09% | €51.55 |
2013 | 0.38% | €51.74 |
2014 | -0.27% | €51.60 |
2015 | -1.54% | €50.81 |
2016 | -1.22% | €50.19 lowest point |
2017 | 0.68% | €50.53 |
2018 | 0.78% | €50.92 |
2019 | 0.54% | €51.20 |
2020 | -1.10% | €50.63 |
2021 | 2.24% | €51.77 |
2022 | 8.08% | €55.95 |
2023 | 3.94% | €58.16 |
2024 | 2.18% | €59.42 |
Avg 13-year rise: | 18.85% | |
2024 vs lowest point 2016: | 18.40% |
Average Price at end of 2011 (assumption for simplicity) : | €100,000 | |
---|---|---|
Year | Nominal % Change | New Average Price (€) |
2012 | -4.71% | €95,290 |
2013 | -8.50% | €87,190 |
2014 | -8.02% | €80,198 |
2015 | -1.82% | €78,738 |
2016 | -0.94% | €77,998 lowest point |
2017 | 1.78% | €79,386 |
2018 | 2.51% | €81,182 |
2019 | 2.16% | €83,379 |
2020 | 0.75% | €83,760 |
2021 | 2.63% | €85,963 |
2022 | 6.60% | €91,637 |
2023 | 8.28% | €99,224 |
2024 | 8.00% | €107,162 |
Avg 13-year rise: | 7.16% | |
2024 vs lowest point 2016: | 37.39% |
Actual Average GME at end of 2011 : | €1967 |
---|---|
Year | New Average GME (€) |
2012 | €1,988 |
2013 | €1,954 |
2014 | €1,892 |
2015 | €1,882 |
2016 | €1,879 lowest point |
2017 | €1,892 |
2018 | €1,939 |
2019 | €1,979 |
2020 | €2,003 |
2021 | €2,056 |
2022 | €2,202 |
2023 | €2,363 |
2024 | €2,400 |
Avg 13-year rise: | 22.01% |
2024 vs lowest point 2016: | 27.73% |
Actual Average GME at end of 2011 : | €1607 |
---|---|
Year | New Average Price (€) |
2012 | €1,611 |
2013 | €1,586 |
2014 | €1,522 |
2015 | €1,509 |
2016 | €1,498 lowest point |
2017 | €1,498 lowest point |
2018 | €1,519 |
2019 | €1,556 |
2020 | €1,573 |
2021 | €1,606 |
2022 | €1,701 |
2023 | €1,792 |
Avg 12-year rise: | 11.51% |
2023 vs lowest point 2016: | 19.63% |
Year | New Full Basic Pension (€) | % Change |
---|---|---|
2012 | €410 | - |
2013 | €415 | 1.23% |
2014 | €415 | 0.00% |
2015 | €415 | 0.00% |
2016 | €415 | 0.00% |
2017 | €419 | 0.81% |
2018 | €419 | 0.00% |
2019 | €420 | 0.42% |
2020 | €422 | 0.45% |
2021 | €442 | 4.58% |
2022 | €447 | 1.22% |
2023 | €466 | 4.20% |
2024 | €484 | 3.89% |
Avg 13-year rise: | 17.96% |
Year | New Full Basic Pension (€) | % Change |
---|---|---|
2012 | €349 | - |
2013 | €353 | 1.23% |
2014 | €353 | 0.00% |
2015 | €353 | 0.00% |
2016 | €353 | 0.00% |
2017 | €356 | 0.81% |
2018 | €356 | 0.00% |
2019 | €357 | 0.42% |
2020 | €359 | 0.45% |
2021 | €375 | 4.58% |
2022 | €380 | 1.22% |
2023 | €396 | 4.20% |
2024 | €411 | 3.89% |
Avg 13-year rise: | 17.96% |
- Table 1: the price of the average basket of goods and services in Cyprus, a measure of inflation following from the CPI index, has cumulatively increased overall by approximately 19% in the 13 years from 2012 to 2024. Being the average, this means that some product prices (i.e., food) might have risen by much more than this percentage, and others by less.
- Table 2: the average house prices have increased by approximately 7% in the 13 years from 2012 to 2024. However, it is worth noting that these were already booming in 2012, a year before the financial crisis of 2013. Also, it might be better to focus on comparing prices between 2016 (lowest point after the crisis) and 2024, to capture the exponential nature of house price rises in recent years. According to data from the Central Bank of Cyprus, there was a 37% cumulative increase in this period, which still continues strong today. Therefore, as an example, if a house was priced at €78,000 in 2016, it would, on average, be priced at €107,000 in 2024. Price raises also vary between cities in Cyprus, with Limassol leading the way in recent times.
- Tables 3 & 4: the average gross monthly earnings of a worker in Cyprus in 2024 were around €2,400. These increased by more than the inflation rate in the last 13 years, at 22% vs 19%. However, the average salary is far from the median (the middle wage – i.e., the wage which is placed in the middle of the population, not the average), which was just around €1,800 in 2024. More importantly, the median gross monthly earnings rose by less than the cumulative inflation rate within the 13-year period, at 12% vs 19% (a better indicator for the level of social welfare). It is clear that the average gross monthly salary is distorted by ludicrous salaries paid especially to workers in specific industries (i.e., see Forex brokers), and does not reflect a general horizontal upward trend in the population as a whole.
- Tables 5 & 6: finally, we could not leave out data for pensions, since the claim that the Social Insurance Scheme in Cyprus is active at least to be able to provide for the elderly, failing to perform in other areas, seems to be invalid just by looking at the numbers. Even though the full basic pension for people with no dependents rose by 18% during the 13 -year period, it was still below €500 per month in 2024, at €484, while the minimum pension for people with no dependents sat even below at €411 (both figures to increase in 2025). For pensioners specifically, as we are talking about very low numbers, this makes us wonder how such a system translates at all into social welfare. In case the strong mediterranean family bond culture which exists in Cyprus were to be absent from many households (i.e., family members providing for each other), how would people be able to survive without any help from family, relatives, or even friends?
Now that we have stated the facts and figures regarding the general economic status, it would be wise to follow from the issue of pensioners and address the Social Insurance Scheme’s main problems, issues and challenges through the years leading to 2025:
- First of all, the Social Insurance Scheme itself was always operating in a greatly inefficient manner in the years leading to the financial crisis of 2013. As is quoted in the study “The Cypriot Pension System: Adequacy and Sustainability” in 2012 (Mannaris & Hewitt, 2012), “the Government Employees Pension Scheme in Cyprus provides retirement and survivors pensions to civil servants, members of the educational service, the police and the armed forces. This is financed almost entirely by general taxation on a pay-as-you-go basis, relying on future contributions and government tax revenues for the payment of pensions.” To make matters worse, public servants were not subject to their own contributions from their salaries towards the scheme until 2013; these were rather funded by the government itself, unlike private sector workers.
- The study, published before the 2013 financial crisis, also warned that “the majority of private sector employees had no supplementary pension protection at all, or they were covered by arrangements, like Defined Contribution Provident Funds rather than Defined Benefits (scheme), with serious weaknesses in terms of their effectiveness as retirement income vehicles. As a result, the main source of retirement income for the majority of the workforce remained the Social Insurance Scheme which would not, alone, be able to offer an adequate, safe and sustainable pension income.”
- Following the haircut in 2013, many private Pension Plans (Greek: “Ταμεία Προνοίας”) were dismantled, thus allocating any money left back to participating members. This was a major downfall at a time of turbulence which affected the long-term pension planning and financial well-being of the then working population. A large number of schemes halted operations, and the cycle was disrupted and left to start again from the beginning (if so), at a later stage.
- Furthermore, the inefficient management and administration of the Social Insurance Scheme meant that it acted more often than not as “a lender of the last resort” to the Cypriot government over the years. Today, the government’s debt to the Social Insurance Fund amounts to approximately €10.7 billion, equivalent to about 30% of the country’s GDP, growing by the month (Karaiskou, 2024). Certainly, this phenomenon is no strange in other countries either, however the major problem in the case of Cyprus is that this practice has become the norm.
The obvious question then arises: how is this debt created? Through the practice of the government not paying dues to the Fund. However, if a private company does the same, the repercussions are by default severe. Both should then be unacceptable. The one positive outcome after the disaster of 2013 was that public servants of the State were asked to start paying contributions.
- Moreover, the majority (98.6%) of the Social Insurance Fund’s current assets of approximately €6 billion (it used to be around €7.2 billion in 2012 and €5.7 billion in 2014) are being held in non-marketable government deposits, while the rest 4% of the assets are invested in medium-term government debt (bonds) and cash deposits in Cypriot commercial banks (Karaiskou, 2024). In an interview with Cyprus Business News in 2024, the Chairman of the Cyprus Fiscal Council highlighted the urgency for the Social Insurance Fund to change and modernise its investment policy. Amongst others, he argued that there is a need for the Fund to “start investing in non-government securities, with the aim of enhancing the diversification of its investment portfolio and achieve higher yields in fields such as renewables, energy, investments related to the environment and its protection, as well as other examples of investments abroad, which could also fix part of the problem of the country’s balance of payments.” Most importantly, however, he highlights the lack of a written investment policy, which must at last be developed.
- In his Actuarial Valuation of the Social Insurance Scheme as of 31 December 2020 (Picard, Stavrakis, & Plamondon, 2024), the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance identified and stressed the same problem. If the Social Insurance Scheme continues without a clear and modern investment policy, its main revenue source now and in the future will continue being contributions. What makes this challenge even greater is the ageing population of Cyprus and the country’s lower fertility rates. The Actuarial Valuation Report of 2020 presents a fertility rate estimation in Cyprus at 1.37 children per woman in 2021 vs over 2.25 in 1992. On the contrary, male life expectancy at birth in Cyprus increased by 11.4% between 1978 and 2020, rising from 72 to 80 years. For females, life expectancy at birth increased from 76 to 84 years during the same period, representing an increase of 10.8%. As the current Social Insurance Scheme reserves/income are based on contributions, they are being significantly influenced by the above demographics. These risks must be mitigated.
In concluding, a modern pension scheme is a solid indication of the welfare state in a country. As it stands today, Cyprus’ Social Insurance Scheme is just serving its current needs. Carrying on with the same practices, it may even struggle to do so in the future. To sustain this scheme, percentage contributions have risen through the years and, indicatively, while in the past 4 workers were contributing for 1 pensioner, this statistic has now been reduced to 3 workers per pensioner. As this article effectively demonstrates, prices are constantly on the rise, the median salaries are not catching up proportionately and pension levels are nowhere near a decent level in 2025. Perhaps now, more than ever, is the time for reforms and the modernisation of the state’s practices. Time is running out; will we be caught by the bell?
Bibliography:
Karaiskou, M. (2024, April). Michalis Persianis: The need for revision and where the Social Insurance Fund could turn for investment. Retrieved from Cyprus Business News: https://www.cbn.com.cy/article/2024/4/10/768826/michalis-persianis-the-need-for-revision-and-where-the-social-insurance-fund-could-turn-for-investment/
Mannaris, P., & Hewitt, A. (2012). The Cypriot Pension System: Adequacy and Sustainability. Retrieved from https://www.ucy.ac.cy/erc2/wp-content/uploads/sites/125/2023/08/CyEPR_Vol6_No2_A4_12_2012.pdf
Picard, A., Stavrakis, C., & Plamondon, P. (2024, January). Actuarial valuation of the General Social Insurance Scheme as of 31 December 2020. Retrieved from mlsi: https://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/sid/sidv2.nsf/All/132FB2BEF689D7B0C2258B01001CD946/$file/Act%20Report%202020.pdf
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